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Introduction
In the past two decades banking has become internationalized to
such an extent that national supervision over domestic banks no
longer provides an adequate framework for regulating bank opera-
tions. Recent circumstances, including several European and Ameri-
can bank failures and the dramatic and unrestrained increase in
private lending to developing countries,' have highlighted the gaps
in supervising international banking. International cooperation
among bank supervisors, which began to develop only a decade ago,
has not yet filled these gaps. Thus, the search for better interna-
tional banking supervision continues as part of the broader quest for
international financial reform.
Are the global operations of banks adequately supervised? Do
supervisors have sufficient capability to prevent a global financial
breakdown? This Article examines the institutions involved with
these questions.
Various institutions address different aspects of international
banking regulation. Although no institution directly regulates inter-
national banking, certain institutions influence that regulation signif-
icantly. Those institutions are the Institute for International
Finance, the Bank for International Settlements, the Cooke Commit-
tee and other supervisory groups, and the Contact Group of the Eu-
ropean Economic Community. In addition, institutions that do not
directly supervise banks, such as the International Monetary Fund
("IMF"), the World Bank, the Paris Club, and private bank advisory
t The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and are not necessarily
those of White & Case.
* Of Counsel, White & Case, Washington, D.C.; formerly, Office of the Legal Ad-
viser, U.S. Department of State; B.A. 1972, J.D. 1975, University of Pennsylvania.
** Associate, White & Case, New York, N.Y.; B.A. 1979, Phi Beta Kappa, Vanderbilt
University;J.D. 1984, Columbia University School of Law.
I Private lending to developing countries dramatically increased in the decade from
1972 through 1981 at an annual rate of over 30%, which in current dollar terms averages
close to $30 billion per year. Bolin & del Canto, LDC Debt: Beyond Crisis Management, 61
FOREIGN AFF. 1099, 1106-07 (1983).
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committees, engage in activities affecting international lending
practices.
I. Institutions Influencing International Lending
A. The International Monetary Fund
While the activities of the IMF are not regulatory in nature, they
do significantly influence international bank lending practices and
operations. Whether loans to developing countries are from govern-
ment or private banks, the IMF usually becomes involved in their
negotiation. In some cases, a debtor country solicits IMF involve-
ment in seeking access to IMF credit facilities and financial expertise.
More commonly, governments or private creditors demand IMF in-
volvement, usually requiring an IMF stabilization program as a pre-
condition for debt renegotiation or continued lending.2 In the eyes
of these creditors, IMF participation in an adjustment program "cer-
tifies" a country's economic management and tends to assure foreign
lenders that a country's external account position will be
sustainable. 3
The IMF requires debtor countries to participate in "condition-
ality" programs as a prerequisite to gaining access to IMF credit fa-
cilities. "Conditionality" denotes a set of corrective economic
policies designed by the IMF to improve a debtor country's balance
of payments deficit within a specified time.4 The more commonly
used austerity measures contained in conditionality programs in-
clude currency devaluation, restrictions on government subsidies
and other spending, changes in wage and price controls, ceilings on
credit expansion by the central bank, and limits on additional exter-
nal borrowing.5
In addition to framing stabilization programs and committing its
own resources in standby or extended credit arrangements, the IMF
also plays a "catalytic role" in raising external finance for debtor
countries. The IMF began helping member countries raise external
finance in the mid-1960's, when these countries requested debt ser-
vice relief from foreign governments, funding of public investment
projects, and programs from multinational consultative groups.
More recently, the IMF informally but actively has persuaded banks
to continue lending to certain countries in Eastern Europe and Latin
America, thus expanding its role beyond "informal persuasion" to
prescribing involuntary lending by private banks. This expansion of
2 Mendez, Recent Trends in Commercial Bank Lending to LDCs: Part of the Problem or Part
of the Solution?, 8 YALEJ. WORLD PUB. ORD. 173, 188 (1982).
3 Robichek, The International Monetary Fund. An Arbiter in the Debt Restructuring Process,
23 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 143, 147 (1984).
4 A.G. CHANDAVARKAR, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND: ITS FINANCIAL ORGAN-
IZATION AND ACTIVITIES 36 (Int'l Monetary Fund Pamphlet Series No. 42, 1984).
5 Mendez, supra note 2, at 190-91.
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the IMF role first occurred in November, 1982, when the IMF in-
formed bankers with major exposures in Argentina and Mexico that
it would not commit its resources to stabilization piograms until the
banks increased their exposures by complementary amounts envis-
aged in the negotiated programs. A similar approach was followed
successfully in Brazil and a number of other countries with stabiliza-
tion programs.6 Whether it is financing balance of payments deficits,
analyzing country economies, prescribing economic adjustment
measures and limits on borrowing, or participating in debt
rescheduling negotiations, the IMF influences when, where, how,
and to whom private banks extend credit.
B. The World Bank
As a development and project finance institution, the World
Bank is not a regulatory institution; yet many of its activities comple-
ment those of the IMF and affect international lending operations of
banks. 7 Relevant activities include the World Bank's structural ad-
justment loans, Special Action Programs, and cofinancing.
The World Bank's Articles of Agreement require it to lend only
for specific projects except under special circumstances. 8 In recent
years the serious balance of payments problems of developing coun-
tries, which threaten their continued development, have presented
the necessary "special circumstances" and motivated the Bank to go
beyond its original mandate by making "structural adjustment"
loans ("SALs"). According to the World Bank:
The main objective of "structural adjustment" lending is to facilitate
the restructuring of a developing country's economy so as to put its
current-account deficit on a sustainable basis within three to five
years. The loan support programs . . . are intended to anticipate
and avert economic crises through economic reforms and changes in
investment priorities. 9
SALs also serve as catalysts for inflows of other external capital that
would help ease balance of payments problems.' 0 SALs require the
6 Robichek, supra note 3, at 147-48; see also E. Brau, R.C. Williams, P. M. Keller and
M. Nowak, Recent Multilateral Debt Restructuring with Official and Bank Creditors 13-14 (Occa-
sional Papers of the Int'l Monetary Fund No. 25, 1983) [hereinafter Recent Multilateral Debt
Restructurings].
7 A.W. Clausen, "The World Bank and International Commercial Banks: Partners
for Development," Remarks to the International Monetary Conference, Vancouver, Can-
ada 8 (May 25, 1982).
8 "Loans made or guaranteed by the Bank shall, except in special circumstances, be
for the purpose of specific projects of reconstruction or development." International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development Articles of Agreement, opened for signature Dec.
27, 1945, art. 3, § 4(vii), 60 Stat. 1440, T.I.A.S. No. 1502, 2 U.N.T.S. 134.
9 WORLD BANK, THE WORLD BANK & INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION 32-33
(1983).
10 Stern, World Bank Financing of Structural Adjustment, in IMF CONDITIONALITY 87, 89
(J. Williamson ed. 1983). The World Bank establishes conditions as part of the steps
required in the structural adjustment program itself. Id. at 99.
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borrower to meet World Bank conditionality criteria. Because such
loans often require debtors to secure an IMF standby credit arrange-
ment, the borrower must meet IMF conditionality criteria as well. "
The World Bank has further responded to the liquidity
problems experienced by developing countries associated with the
debt crisis by establishing a Special Action Program ("SAP"). The
SAP authorizes expanded lending for high priority operations sup-
porting structural adjustment policy changes, production for export,
greater use of existing capacity, and the maintenance of vital
infrastructure. ' 2
"Cofinancing" is another means by which the World Bank has
sought to increase the flow of private funds to member developing
countries. Cofinancing links a World Bank presence with additional
external investment finance from official lenders, export credit insti-
tutions, and private sources.i 3 The World Bank's objectives are not
only to increase available funds but also to lengthen loan maturity
periods and minimize borrowing costs. 14 Cofinancing provides lend-
ers with certain guarantees of World Bank financing and assurances
that projects are well-conceived and supervised. The World Bank's
participation in cofinancing with commercial banks may take several
forms. The World Bank may participate directly in securing later
maturity periods for private bank loans, may instead guarantee those
later maturities, or may participate if interest rates rise above a cer-
tain level.' 5 Thus, World Bank participation makes financing avail-
able on terms comfortable for banks and debtor countries.' 6
Like the IMF, the World Bank influences private lending directly
and indirectly: directly by its participation in debt rescheduling ne-
gotiations; and indirectly by its own lending and analyses of econo-
mies, policies, and project proposals of developing countries. While
national bank regulation may typically focus on such prudential
measures as capital-asset ratios, World Bank and IMF approval of
countries' economic plans provides a different sort of prudential
control on international bank lending.
C. The Paris Club
The "Paris Club" is the "institution" through which credits ex-
tended by governments or by private lenders possessing a creditor-
' 1 COMMONWEALTH STUDY GROUP, TOWARDS A NEW BRETTON WOODS: CHALLENGES
FOR THE WORLD FINANCIAL TRADING SYSTEM 58-59 (1983) [hereinafter NEW BRETrON
WOODS]. SAL conditionality emphasizes "policy dialogue" over the quantitative perform-
ance targets imposed by the IMF. Id. at 58.
12 WORLD BANK, 1984 ANNUAL REPORT 47 (1985).
13 WORLD BANK, COFINANCING 1, 5-9 (1983).
14 WORLD BANK, supra note 12, at 23-25.
15 WORLD BANK, supra note 13, at 1-2, 11-13.
16 Rieffel, The Paris Club, 1978-1983, 23 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 83 n.I (1984).
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government guarantee are rescheduled.' 7 Despite its name, the
Paris Club has no members and no written operating rules. It does
have a chairman, a French Ministry of Finance official, who-convenes
meetings upon formal request by a debtor country.' 8 All reschedul-
ings are done on a case by case basis, but "institutional memory"
allows due regard to precedent.' 9
The Paris Club originated in 1956 when a group of creditor gov-
ernments met in Paris to negotiate a debt relief arrangement with
Argentina. 20 Creditor countries wanted to establish common terms
for debt restructuring applications rather than negotiate a series of
bilateral arrangements with debtor countries. 2' Since that time the
Paris Club has conducted more than sixty-five reschedulings and has
become an integral part of efforts to manage the global debt crisis. 22
Although the debtor must initiate the request for debt relief to
procure Paris Club assistance, creditors must be persuaded that the
debtor will default on its external payments without such relief. This
situation is labeled "imminent default."' 23 Creditors normally await
an IMF staff paper describing the debtor country's standby request
before taking a negotiating position on credit terms. 24 At the actual
Paris Club meeting, IMF, World Bank, and UNCTAD representa-
tives are present. While proposals and counterproposals are made,
the debtor and creditors usually reach an agreement within two days.
A Paris Club agreement, however, only provides a framework for fu-
17 Id. at 91. "In some respects the 'Paris Club' is a misnomer, for it has no 'mem-
bers.' Rather, it has 'participating creditor countries.' The Paris Club is less an institution
and more an ad hoc procedure for renegotiation of debts owed to official creditors ..
Id.
18 Recent Multilateral Debt Restructurings, supra note 6, at 15.
19 Rieffel, supra note 16, at 83.
20 M.S. Mendelsohn, COMMERCIAL BANKS AND THE RESTRUCTURING OF CROSS-BORDER
DEBT 31 (1983).
21 Commercial banks were not involved in debt relief in the late 1950s and early
1960s because they were not major creditors. In the late 1960s creditor governments
experimented with debt relief as a form of development assistance. In the early 1970s
creditor governments were first faced with debtor-country insolvency. Creditor govern-
ments then granted long term rescheduling at concessional interest rates. In the mid-
1970s, however, official creditors abandoned debt relief as a form of aid and commercial
banks were faced with reschedulings on their own. Rieffel, supra note 16, at 83-84.
Although the Paris Club is open to any creditor country with a significant exposure in the
debtor country concerned, as a practical matter only Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development ("OECD") member countries have participated in Paris Club nego-
tiations. Id. at 92. Other multilateral fora, such as aid consortia, the OECD, and special
creditor groups, have provided debt relief, but the negotiating framework has remained
essentially the same. Recent Multilateral Debt Restructurings, supra note 6, at 15.
22 Rieffel, supra note 16, at 84-85.
23 Id. at 95-97. The Paris Club has renegotiated debt of nonmembers of the IMF,
such as Cuba, Poland, and Mozambique, by substituting a task force to evaluate the coun-
try's recovery plan. Sington, The Most Exclusive Club in Paris, EUROMONEY, Oct. 1985, at
383.
24 Rieffel, supra note 16, at 97, 106. UNCTAD is the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development.
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ture negotiation because bilateral agreements between the debtor
country and each participating creditor must subsequently be
executed. 25
The Paris Club process divides creditors into four broad groups:
multilateral lending institutions, such as the IMF and the World
Bank; official creditors participating in the Paris Club negotiations;
non-participating official creditors; and private creditors, such as
commercial banks.26
The Paris Club generally attempts to implement the principle of
burdensharing among participating creditors. This requirement of
providing relief commensurate with a creditor's exposure in the
debtor country is not applied, however, to multilateral lending insti-
tutions. Participating official creditors ensure burdensharing from
non-participating official creditors through "non-discrimination"
clauses in standard Paris Club agreements. If a debtor country, hav-
ing signed such a clause, pays more to non-participating creditors
than is consistent with Paris Club terms, then Paris Club creditors
have the right to demand larger payments from the debtor.27
Non-discrimination clauses are not applied to private creditors;
instead, the concept of "comparable treatment" is used. Essentially,
debtor governments agree to seek relief from the banks on terms
comparable to those sought from official creditors. Specifically, the
terms are to be as generous in the context of normal commercial
lending as those offered by creditor governments in the context of
their lending. "Comparable treatment" recognizes that government
creditors should be more generous in their terms than banks because
commercial lending is profit-motivated and involves tax, income, and
regulatory implications that government lenders need not
confront.2 8
Several institutional reforms of the Paris Club process have been
proposed. First, creating a more permanent form for the Paris Club
process has been suggested. Second, the process has been criticized
for the frequency with which debtor countries must return to
reschedule their debts. Third, some commentators have called for
generalized debt relief or long-term "workout arrangements."
Fourth, some debtors have objected to the participation of the
IMF. 29
25 Id. at 87.
26 Id. at 87-88. Whether co-financiers with multilateral institutions will be similarly
treated as exempt from burdensharing requirements is a matter of debate. Id. at 87 n. 15.
27 Id. at 90.
28 Nigeria recently attempted to deal with its creditors without first obtaining IMF
approval of its economic reforms. Nigeria Promotes Its Strategy for Foreign Debt Repayment,
Wash. Post, Jan. 16, 1986, at A23, col. 4.
29 Rieffel, supra note 16, at 108. Between 1978 and August 1, 1985 the Paris Club
rescheduled $47 billion in foreign debt. Sington, supra note 23, at 383.
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Since 1956 more than sixty-five Paris Club agreements have
been completed, forty of which were concluded between 1978 and
1983. Overall, as U.S. Treasury economist Alexis Rieffel has said:
The Paris Club system works . . . given the amounts involved, the
conflicting interests of debtors and creditors, and the differing views
among creditors, it is remarkable how smoothly the negotiations
proceeded in all but a few cases. It also is remarkable how little
time, effort and expense has been involved in these negotiations.
3 0
D. Bank Advisory Committees
Commercial bank creditors have developed a restructuring pro-
cess similar to that of the Paris Club. Previously, such creditors ne-
gotiated lengthy and complex restructuring agreements. Currently,
banks reach a precatory agreement on the treatment of different debt
categories. Separate restructuring agreements between the debtor
country and the creditor banks are then negotiated to complement
the broad agreement on principles.3 '
Bank advisory or coordinating committees normally provide the
framework for reaching such restructuring agreements. These com-
mittees are often referred to as the London Club.3 2 Such a commit-
tee acts as advisor and liaison for all bank creditors. The committee
provides a forum for discussing coverage and restructuring terms
and, as necessary, maintaining short-term bank exposure and provid-
ing new financing.3 3 The banks having the largest exposure to
debtor countries usually chair the advisory groups.
3 4
The IMF participates in negotiating meetings of the bank advi-
sory committees on request. Private banks frequently insist, either as
a condition precedent to executing a restructuring agreement or as a
precondition to initiating debt renegotiations, that an IMF adjust-
ment program be in place. A World Bank structural adjustment loan
program may similarly be required. A Paris Club agreement may
also precede bank renegotiations to allow comparable treatment or
to assure IMF participation.3 5
Banks have been unwilling to reschedule payments at less than
market-related interest rates. Therefore, restructuring usually re-
quires banks to provide additional financing. Banks have also re-
sisted rescheduling interest payments because rescheduling might
30 Mudge, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Current Perspective, in DEFAULT AND
RESCHEDULING: CORPORATE AND SOVEREIGN BORROWERS IN DIFFICULTY 85, 90 (D. Suratgar
ed. 1984).
31 See generally Hudes, Coordination of Paris and London Club Reschedulings, 17 N.Y.U.J.
INT'L L. & POL. 553 (1985).
32 Recent Multilateral Debt Restructurings, supra note 6, at 23.
33 M.S. Mendelsohn, supra note 20, at 15.
34 Nowzad, The Role of the IMF in Rescheduling International Debt, in DEFAULT AND
RESCHEDULING, supra note 30, at 131, 134.
35 See generally Recent Multilateral Debt Restructurings, supra note 6, at 22-28.
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cause loans to be reclassified as nonperforming assets.36
A recent development in restructuring sovereign debt is the ne-
gotiation of multi-year restructuring agreements ("Myras"). Unlike
past restructuring agreements, which dealt only with maturities com-
ing due in the same or the following year, Myras cover maturities of
five or more years. Partly in return for getting a longer term commit-
ment from banks, the debtor agrees to the following terms: biannual
rather than annual visits by the IMF with the attendant confidential
report made available to the creditor banks; and a currency switch
mechanism so that banks outside the United States can switch their
loans into their home currency. Myras also reduce the sovereign's
debt service obligations by tying such funds to an inter-bank rate
("Libor") or a cost-of-funds domestic rate instead of a margin over
prime rate. The theory is that Myras create a payment schedule that
sovereigns are more likely to be able to meet.3 7
Suggestions-similar to those advanced about the Paris Club-
that bank advisory committees should be transformed into semi-per-
manent institutions have been made. Improved information and
analysis resulting from more continuous operation of such commit-
tees would enable the parties to respond before a severe financial
shortfall arrives. Partial reschedulings and closer coordination be-
tween the World Bank, IMF, and private creditors would then be
possible. As another needed improvement, central banks might help
to prevent smaller banks with limited exposures to foreign debtors
from withdrawing their funds.38
The Paris Club and bank advisory committee processes have re-
sulted in successful international debt rescheduling. Together these
institutions impose terms of imminent default, conditionality,
burdensharing, and involuntary lending on debtor countries and
their official and private creditors. Through these means, the perma-
nent and ad hoc institutions have managed to defer the global debt
crisis. Nonetheless, most observers continue to believe that addi-
tional international regulatory improvements are needed.
E. The Baker Plan
During the 1985 annual meeting of the World Bank and IMF,
U.S. Treasury Secretary James A. Baker III unveiled a new U.S.-
36 Stoakes, Myra Makes the Years Roll By, EUROMONEY, Oct. 1985, at 29.
37 NEw BRETrON WOODS, supra note 11, at 66-67.
38 Hormats, The World Economy Under Stress, 64 FOREIGN AFF. 455, 474 (1985). The
countries intended to benefit from the plan are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colom-
bia, Ecuador, Ivory Coast, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Uruguay, Vene-
zuela, and Yugoslavia, countries which collectively owe $437 billion, $275 billion of which
is debt to commercial banks worldwide, all of which carries approximately 10% interest.
Martin & Westlake, Baker's Dough Is Failing to Rise, SoUTH,Jan. 1986, at 85; see also Loomis,
Why Baker's Debt Plan Won't Work, FORTUNE, Dec. 23, 1985, at 98.
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sponsored initiative aimed at fostering growth in developing coun-
tries and curtailing the international debt crisis. A broad emphasis
on economic growth as a condition for the payment of developing
country debt lies at the heart of the Baker initiative. Baker's "Pro-
gram for Sustained Growth" calls upon commercial banks to lend an
additional 20 billion dollars over three years to support economic
growth in fifteen developing countries. 39 In addition, the program
encourages international financial institutions, including the World
Bank, to increase lending by 9 billion dollars to support structural
policy improvements and to supplement continued balance of pay-
ments lending by the IMF. In return for increased capital flows, the
fifteen developing countries are urged to implement sound fiscal and
monetary policies, strengthen their private sectors, facilitate foreign
investment, liberalize trade, and pursue market-oriented approaches
to currencies, interest rates, and prices.40
The reaction of the international community to the Baker Plan
has varied considerably. On October 28, 1985, the Institute of Inter-
national Finance convened a meeting of the sixty banks from around
the world holding eighty-five percent of the third world debt.
Although the major U.S. commercial banks praised the Baker Plan-
unsurprising, given their extensive exposure to debtor countries-
regionally oriented U.S. banks as well as European and Japanese
banks reacted warily. Many banks wanted guarantees from industri-
alized country governments for increased bank loans. Less than two
months after the Baker Plan was unveiled, the heads of the World
Bank and IMF, with the endorsement of their boards of directors,
issued an unprecedented joint statement of support for the Plan.4 1
Despite the Baker Plan's apparent emphasis on growth rather
than austerity, developing countries have, for several reasons, been
noticeably slow in endorsing the overall program. First, the Plan will
require developing countries to implement painful and politically
sensitive policy corrections, including cuts in government payrolls
and subsidies to state enterprises. Second, although the Plan is
viewed by the majority of developing countries as a positive step,
most, if not all, feel that the Plan does not go far enough. According
to several economic officials from developing countries and some
economists from the industrialized world, two key components for
resolving debt crises, abating high interest rates and protectionism
in the United States and Europe, are not addressed in the Baker
39 Manning, Dough for Baker's Dozen, FAR E. ECON. REV. Dec. 5, 1985, at 68; Hormats,
supra note 38, at 474-75.
40 Martin & Westlake, supra note 38, at 85.
41 Farnsworth, LM.F. Says Banks Back Baker Plan, N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1985, at DI,
col. 3; Witcher, Latin Debtors Dissatisfied with U.S. Plan, Wall St.J., Dec. 17, 1985, at 37, col.
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Plan.4 2 Finally, some debtor countries view the Plan as another at-
tempt by the industrialized world to interfere in internal policy-mak-
ing, all for the sake of ensuring the stability of the major
international banks.
Despite concerns expressed about the Baker Plan, the Reagan
Administration appears determined to forge ahead with the initia-
tive, assuming a model debtor can be found to test the scheme. At
the moment, this model debtor appears to be Argentina, which in the
eyes of the international banks has undergone a remarkable eco-
nomic reconstruction in just eighteen months. Although Argentina
has held several meetings with officials from the United States,
World Bank, and IMF, it remains unclear whether the country will
choose to take advantage of the Baker Plan.43 Even if the Baker Plan
is implemented and the economies of debtor countries grow, many
believe that more drastic measures are needed for the debtor coun-
tries to shoulder their debt burden.
II. Influencing Bank Regulation
A. Institute of International Finance
The Institute of International Finance (the "Institute") is an or-
ganization of private commercial banks created to improve the pro-
cess of sovereign risk lending. The idea for the Institute was
conceived at a meeting sponsored by the National Planning Associa-
tion held at Ditchley Park, England, in May, 1982. 4 4 Later that year,
representatives of thirty-one major banks from eight countries met in
New York to decide upon operating procedures. The Institute of
International Finance, Inc., was incorporated in Washington, D.C.,
as a non-profit institution in January 1983. As of 1984, 189 commer-
cial banks from thirty-nine countries were members. This represents
more than eighty percent of total international banking exposure to
the developing world. 45
Participants at the first Ditchley meeting recognized the private
banking community's need for up-to-date financial and economic in-
formation on debtor countries and identified four basic deficiencies
42 Burns, The Reluctant Guineapig: Argentina Sees the Baker Plan as a Start-but Has Reser-
vations About Its Own Test-Case Status, SOUTH, Feb. 1986, at 44-45.
43 Surrey & Nash, Bankers Look Beyond the Debt Crisis: The Institute of International Fi-
nance, Inc., 23 COLUM.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 111, 113 (1984). The National Planning Associa-
tion, a private nonprofit organization, brings together representatives from business,
labor, agriculture, and the professions to discuss and publish reports on domestic and
international issues affecting the American people. Id. at 111 n. 1.
44 Id. at 117. Any commercial bank with international exposure from loans in its
portfolio for its own risk can become a member of the Institute. Excluded are banks not
participating in international lending in any significant way and those lending only for the
account of official agencies. Id. at 116.
45 W. CLINE, INTERNATIONAL DEBT AND STABILITY OF THE WORLD ECONOMY 97 (Inst.
for Int'l Econ., Pol'y Analysis in Int'l Econ. No. 4, 1983).
[VOL. I11
REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL BANKING
in the flow of information. First, debtor nations provide information
to official institutions, such as the Bank for International Settlements
(the "BIS") and the IMF, on a confidential sovereign-to-sovereign
basis. Although private commercial banks cannot readily gain access
to this information, they are still expected to participate actively in
restructuring schemes developed by the official multilateral institu-
tions. Second, the data available to the banking community is not as
current as it should be. For example, information from official
sources is frequently out of date by six months or more. According
to the "information gap" hypothesis on the 1982 debt crisis, because
individual banks did not know how rapidly their competitors were
expanding lending (especially short-term lending), by the time the
true magnitude of increased debt was known the situation was out of
control. 46 Third, because smaller, regional banks perceive the
larger, money-center banks as having far more sophisticated infor-
mation about the financial condition of borrowing countries, they
have been far less willing to continue lending to debtor countries
since the advent of the debt crisis. Fourth, information reported by
borrowing countries varies considerably in quality. The Institute,
therefore, could obtain information, sufficiently current for banks to
make independent credit judgments, which would be available to
smaller and non-money-center banks. This information would be
drawn from official reports already prepared by the BIS, the IMF,
and the World Bank and from member banks which have collected
information from debtor countries. 47
To improve the process of international lending, the Institute
has undertaken three main tasks: to improve the timeliness and
quality of information available on sovereign borrowers; to facilitate
communication among the major participants in the international
lending; and to encourage an exchange of views within the financial
community on the future of international lending.
1. Information
Data on each borrowing country's overall economic situation
and debt problems is covered on an eighty-line data table, available
by direct computer access, including roughly thirty developing coun-
tries. In-depth country reports, prepared by the Institute's staff, re-
view each country's economic policies, development plans, balance
of payments prospects, and external financing requirements. These
46 Surrey & Nash, supra note 43, at 112-13.
47 Id. at 118-22. The range of issues includes flexible new approaches to terms in
rescheduling agreements, legal and technical aspects of reschedulings, and institutional
initiatives such as cofinancing, insurance/guarantees, establishing a private lender of last
(resort, and organizing secondary markets for LDC paper. Institute of International Fi-
nance, The Working Party on the Future of International Lending 1 (unpublished
manuscript).
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reports focus on the kinds of information most valuable to commer-
cial bankers making lending decisions.
2. Facilitating Communication
The Institute conducts country visits with an Institute staff mem-
ber and several representatives from debtor nations to facilitate com-
munication. It also represents the views of the commercial banking
community before various multilateral organizations and govern-
ment regulatory bodies.
3. Exchange of Views
Under the auspices of the Institute, the Working Party on the
Future of International Bank Lending has met several times to ex-
change views and established committees on various issues involved
in debt restructuring. 48 This is the first attempt by the banking in-
dustry as a whole to deal cooperatively with sovereign debt issues.
Commentators envision other potential roles for the Institute.
Economist William Cline, for example, suggests that the Institute
prepare country credit ratings since it would not be subject to the
political pressures that affect the IMF. Cline also suggests that the
Institute could help mobilize lending from smaller banks. Major
banks have often been compelled to provide capital to preserve their
existing individual large exposures. Some smaller banks, however,
have attempted to avoid continued lending to debtor countries. To
some extent, this "free ride" phenomenon has been reduced
through pressure applied on smaller banks by central banks and
large private banks. The Institute might add some degree of moral
persuasion to these efforts. 49
B. The Bank for International Settlements
The Bank for International Settlements, located in Basel, Swit-
zerland, is an organization of central banks. It was established in
1930 to promote cooperation among central banks, to provide addi-
tional facilities for financial operations, and to act as trustee for post-
World War I reparations agreements. 50
The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) has twenty-nine
members. The United States is a member through a group of private
U.S. banks, although it is the only country (entitled to do so) whose
central bank has chosen not to be represented on the Board of Direc-
tors. The central banks of Australia, Canada, Japan, and South Af-
48 W. CLINE, supra note 45, at 97.
49 BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS STATUTES, 'art. 3.
50 Report to Congress by the Secretary of the Treasury, the Chairman of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and the Secretary of State on United States
Membership in the Bank for International Settlements 2-3 (Nov. 30, 1984).
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rica are the only other non-European members. While all of the
Eastern European central banks, except for the Soviet Union, East
Germany, and Albania, are members, no developing country central
banks are included among the membership. 5 '
The BIS is both a forum where central bankers meet to discuss
issues of common concern and an international financial institution.
Since 1963 the BIS has hosted monthly meetings ten times annually
of central bank representatives from the Group of Ten countries 52
for discussions of national and international economic issues. Spe-
cialists in foreign exchange, the Eurocurrency markets, and bank su-
pervision meet regularly under BIS auspices as well. In addition, the
BIS serves as the secretariat for periodic meetings of the Governors
of Central Banks of the European community and is part of the sec-
retariat for the Group of Ten ministers and governors. 53
The BIS has mobilized financing at various times. In the 1960s
and 1970s BIS discussions facilitated balance of payments financing
for several European countries. More recently, medium-term credit
lines to the IMF have been arranged through a number of central
banks. 54 In 1982 and 1983, the BIS helped arrange bridge financing
for several countries that were then facing debt-service problems.
These arrangements led to short-term multilateral credits while new
medium- and long-term lending commitments were finalized. 55 Not
only did the BIS organize central bank participation in these financial
arrangements, but it also committed its own institutional resources.
The BIS is not an international lender of last resort facility. In
fact, no such facility now exists. Following the Herstatt bank failure
in 1974, the central bank governors of the Group of Ten and Swit-
zerland issued a communique that touched on the lender of last re-
sort function: The Governors recognized that it would not be
practical to lay down in advance detailed rules and procedures for
the provision of temporary liquidity. But they were satisfied that
means are available for that purpose and will be used if and when
necessary.5 6 The bank governors assumed that the principle of "pa-
rental responsibility" applied, and thus that the central bank super-
vising a bank's headquarters would provide emergency financing. 5 7
51 Id. at 9. The Group of Ten includes the United States, the United Kingdom, Can-
ada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, and Japan.
52 Id. at 9-10.
53 Id. at 11.
54 Recent Multilateral Debt Restructurings, supra note 6, at 27.
55 Bank for International Settlements, Press Communique (Basle, Sept. 9, 1974),
quoted in G.G. JOHNSON, with R.K. ABRAMS, ASPECTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL BANKING
SAFETY NET 23 (Occasional Papers of the Int'l Monetary Fund No. 17, 1983) [hereinafter
INTERNATIONAL BANKING SAFETY NET]. See also NEW BRErON WOODS, supra note 11, at 67-
69.
56 Basagni, Approaches to the Prudential Supervision of International Lending, in BANKS AND
THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 162 (BJ. Cohen ed. 1981).
57 W. CLINE, INTERNATIONAL DEBT: SYSTEMIC RISK AND POLICY RESPONSE 120 (1984).
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Nonetheless, the BIS communique applies only to Group of Ten
banks and the allocation of responsibility for subsidiaries is unclear.
Therefore, this attempt to provide assurances of a lender of last re-
sort remains quite imperfect.5 8
The BIS functions of providing a forum and arranging financ-
ings are complemented by its third role of compiling information.
For example, since 1981 the BIS has collected consolidated data-as
a result of Cooke Committee efforts-on asset and liability maturities
so that the maturity mismatching problem can be better understood
and addressed. 59
C. The Cooke Committee
In 1974 the Bank for International Settlements, seeking to ad-
dress new issues in international banking supervision, created a
standing committee of bank supervisors from the Group of Ten
countries plus Luxembourg and Switzerland. This Committee on
Bank Regulations and Supervisory Practices is referred to as the Ba-
sel Committee or by the name of its chairman, currently Peter Cooke
of the Bank of England.
The basic role of supervision is to ensure that banks have ade-
quate procedures to manage risk and possess sufficient information
on which to base lending decisions.60 The Cooke Committee was
designed to augment national supervision techniques. In the words
of Chairman Cooke:
The purpose of the Committee is to provide a regular forum for
closer international cooperation on banking supervisory matters and
to work towards improving the cohesion of arrangements for super-
vising the activities of banks operating in international markets. It
has set out to do this in three ways: (1) to improve the general cov-
erage and effectiveness of supervisory techniques for international
banking business, (2) to address particular prudential problems af-
fecting banks operating internationally and (3) to exchange informa-
tion on national supervisory arrangements with the object of
improving the quality of banking supervision worldwide. 6'
The Committee meets three times a year in Basel. The personal
contacts between supervisors resulting from these meetings have
created a de facto early warning system for bank crises. 62 Supervi-
Both host-country and parent-country central banks share responsibility for supervising
subsidiaries, according to the revised Concordat, but such supervisory responsibility does
not necessarily apply to lender-of-last resort responsibility. Id. See infra text accompanying
notes 66-67.
58 INTERNATIONAL BANKING SAFETY NET, supra note 55, at 28.
59 R. Williams, P. Keller, J. Lipsky & D. Mathieson, International CapitalMarkets: Devel-
opments and Prospects, 1983 19 (Occasional Papers of the Int'l Monetary Fund No. 23, 1983).
60 Cooke, Basle Supervisors' Committee, 8 IssuEs BANK REG. 7, 8 (1984).
61 INTERNATIONAL BANKING SAFETY NET, supra note 55, at 26.
62 Cooke, Developments in Cooperation Among Banking Supervisory Authorities, 21 BANK OF
ENG. Q. BULL. 238, 240 (1981).
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sors call on supervisors of other nationalities, whom they already
know and trust, for information or tactical planning when a banking
problem appears on the horizon.
One of the most important projects of the Cooke Committee
has been developing and propagating the Basel Concordat in 1975
and the revised Concordat in 1983. In 1975 the Central Bank Gov-
ernors of the Group of Ten approved a set of broad guidelines de-
marcating responsibilities among national supervisory authorities.
The Concordat's two fundamental objectives are that no foreign
bank should escape supervision and that supervision should be ade-
quate. The guidelines embody the following key principles: (1) su-
pervising foreign banking establishments is the joint responsibility of
parent and host authorities; (2) no foreign banking establishment
should escape supervision; (3) supervising liquidity should be the
primary responsibility of host authorities; (4) supervising solvency is
essentially a matter for the parent authority in the case of foreign
branches and primarily the responsibility of the host authority in the
case of foreign subsidiaries; (5) practical cooperation should be pro-
moted by exchanges of information between host and parent author-
ities and by authorizing bank inspections by parent authorities in the
territory of host authorities.6 s
The revised Concordat, published in 1983, differs from the 1975
agreement in several ways. First, it incorporates the principle of con-
solidated supervision. Supervisors cannot be assured of an individ-
ual bank's soundness without knowing that the banking group,
comprised of the parent, branches, and subsidiaries, has not as-
sumed total commitments and risks that are disproportionate to the
group's capital base. 64 The consolidated supervision proposed in
the revised Concordat applies to country risk exposure as well as
capital adequacy. 65 Second, supervisory gaps have resulted from in-
adequate supervisory standards in certain countries, especially off-
shore banking centers, and from the existence of non-branch
entities, such as holding companies and non-banking companies that
can be exempt from supervision of parental authorities. The revised
Concordat, clarifies that host-country and parent-country central
banks jointly share responsibility for supervising branches and sub-
sidiaries with respect to liquidity; however, regarding solvency, par-
ent central banks supervise, while joint parent-host supervision is
required for subsidiaries. 66 Third, the revised Concordat explicitly
states what was implicit earlier: the central banks will not necessarily
63 INTERNATIONAL BANKING SAFETY NET, supra note 55, at 21.
64 Id. at 16.
65 W. CLINE, supra note 45, at 120.
66 Cooke, The New Concordat-Principles for the Supervision of Banks' Foreign Establishments,
8 ISSUEs BANK REG. 25 (1984).
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act as lenders of last resort. 67
The Cooke Committee, along with other supervisory groups,
addresses a continuing agenda of international banking problems.
Current issues include techniques of international cooperation, im-
provements in the exchange of information, standards of capital ade-
quacy, professional assessment of risk, and the practical problems of
dealing with failing or failed banks.68
D. Other Groups of Banking Supervisors
The Cooke Committee realized that to establish universal and
adequate banking supervision it needed to spread the principles and
practices of supervisory cooperation beyond its own membership.
The Committee, therefore, circulated committee documents among
the supervisory groupings, particularly among developing financial
centers. As a result, several new groups are now in operation, in-
cluding the Offshore Supervisors' Group; the Commission of Latin
American and Caribbean Banking Supervisory and Inspection Orga-
nizations; and other similar groupings in the Middle East, Southeast
Asia and Western Pacific regions; Scandanavian countries; and Cen-
tral American Republics. 69
Additionally, several international conferences of supervisory
authorities have promoted cooperative action with nonmembers.
Supervisors at the first conference, held in London in 1979, gener-
ally accepted the Concordat principles. The Offshore Supervisors'
Group itself has accepted the Concordat principles, a significant step
since offshore banking centers are the weak link in adequate banking
supervision.
The Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors (the "Offshore
Group") has been meeting annually since October 1980. Its mem-
bership 70 is open to any offshore banking center which has endorsed
the revised Basel Concordat and has a governmental structure capa-
ble of implementing the Concordat's principles. The Offshore
Group has gone beyond endorsing the Concordat to agree upon the
following: (1) offshore supervisory authorities must know the extent
to which parent authorities are supervising banks operating in off-
shore territories on a consolidated basis; (2) offshore supervisory au-
thorities must carefully consider the financial standing and
67 Cooke, Overview of International Supervisory Issues, 8 IssuEs BANK REG. 3, 5 (1984).
68 Id. at 4-5. For brief summaries of the EXPERT Banking Group of the OECD, the
Nordic Supervisory Group, SEANZA Forum of Bank Supervisors, Banking Supervisors of
the Carribbean, and Gulf Coordinating Council of Central Banks, see Appendix I, reprinted
from Bench & Sable, infra note 69, at app. B.
69 Current members include Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Cayman Islands, Cyprus,
Gibraltar, Guernsey, Hong Kong, Isle of Man, Jersey, Lebanon, Netherlands Antilles, Pan-
ama, Singapore, and Vanuata. Bench & Sable, The Structure of Proposed and Controlling
Agreements Regulating Transnational Banking Operations 13 (unpublished manuscript).
70 Id. at 14.
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reputation of applicants for bank licenses; (3) the Offshore Group
will notify parent authorities of licensing applications by parent
banks to offshore centers; (4) host and parent authorities should con-
sult on an ongoing basis. 7 '
The Commission of Latin American and Caribbean Banking Su-
pervisory and Inspection Authorities (the "Commission") was organ-
ized in July 1981 and has generally been meeting annually since
then. Currently, the Commission has twenty-three members. 72 In
addition to endorsing the Concordat, the Commission has focused
general and technical discussions on the following subjects: stan-
dardizing asset valuation and capital adequacy in inflationary set-
tings; the impact of the debt crisis on bank supervisors; more
uniform rules for establishing and operating foreign banks in mem-
ber countries; standards for credit diversification; improved financial
disclosure; early warning systems; and deposit insurance.
73
E. The Advisory Banking Committee and the Contract
Group of the EEC
Whereas the Cooke Committee endeavors to bring about a
gradual "convergence" in practice in banking supervision, the Euro-
pean Economic Community (the "EEC") promotes harmonization
through legal directives. Harmonizing banking supervision repre-
sents a step towards creating and regulating the common market in
banking as envisioned by the 1957 Treaty of Rome. 74
In 1977 the EEC Council of Ministers adopted the First Banking
Coordination Directive. It established minimum authorization crite-
ria for credit institutions, uniform calculation of prudential ratios for
solvency and liquidity (initially for observation purposes only), and
the Advisory Banking Committee to assist with further coordination
efforts. More recently, the 1983 Consolidation Directive prescribed
supervision of banks on a consolidated basis. It directed member
states to eliminate all legal obstacles, including national banking laws
and regulations, to the exchange of the information necessary for
consolidated supervision.7 5 To support consolidated supervision,
the Advisory Banking Committee introduced a new series of obser-
vation ratios covering solvency, liquidity and profitability.
The Advisory Banking Committee is a high level policy-making
committee, backed by a secretariat from the EEC Commission, which
in turn makes recommendations to the EEC council. It consists of
not more than three representatives from each member state and the
71 Id. at 15.
72 Id. at 16-17.
73 Muller, 4 Legal Framework for International Supervision: The EEC Model, 8 ISSUES BANK
REG. 36 (1984); R. DALE, BANK SUPERVISION AROUND THE WORLD 6 (1982).
74 Muller, supra note 73, at 38-39.
75 R. DALE, supra note 73, at 6.
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EEC Commission, and usually meets twice a year in Brussels. The
committee works alongside the EEC Commission to formulate gen-
eral policy guidelines for supervisory coordination within the Euro-
pean Economic Community. 76
Supporting coordination work of the EEC Commission and the
Advisory Banking Group is an informal club of member states' su-
pervisory authorities know as the Contact Group. Established in
1971, the Group provides national supervisors with a forum to ex-
change views and develop an understanding of each other's regula-
tory systems. The Group submits to the Advisory Banking Group or
the EEC Commission detailed studies that provide a basis for formal
harmonization proposals. The Contact Group also frequently ex-
changes information with the Cooke Committee. 7 7
Since 1972 the Contact Group has met regularly, generally three
times a year, with the EEC Commission attending since 1975. The
Group's work has evolved over the past decade into four main activi-
ties: (1) information is exchanged about particular problem institu-
tions when there may be implications for supervisors in other
member states; (2) the Contact Group meets to keep members
abreast of developments in national supervisory arrangements; (3) it
conducts comparative studies addressing different aspects of super-
visory practices in the member states. Prudential reporting and the
control of risk concentration, interest rate risk, and off-balance sheet
risk were all recently studied; (4) the Contact Group works with the
EEC Commission and the Banking Advisory Committee, although
this informal role was not envisioned by the Contact Group's
founders. 78
Conclusion
Generally, the goals of banking regulation are promoting bank
stability, protecting the public against instability, and promoting the
efficiency and integrity of financial services. 79 Bank stability has the
following aspects:
the potential for external disturbances, which may take the form of
credit, interest rate or other shocks; the capacity of banks to with-
stand such disturbances, as measured, for instance, by capital and
liquidity ratios; and the ability and willingness of national or interna-
tional authorities to provide support in the event that individual in-
stitutions or the system as a whole should experience severe
76 Id. at 6-7 (unpublished manuscript presented at the Central Banking Seminar of
the International Monetary Fund in Washington, D.C.. June 28-July 13, 1982).
77 Schneider, The Contact Group of EEC Supervisory Authorities, 8 ISSUES BANK REG. 15,
16-17 (1984).
78 R. BENCH, A FRAMEWORK AND NEW TECHNIQUES FOR INTERNATIONAL BANK SUPERVI-
SION 6-7 (1982).
79 R. DALE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL BANKING 3 (1984).
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financial strains. 80
The debt crisis has shown that, in their international lending, the
major U.S., European, and Japanese banks have not adequately as-
sessed the potential for external disturbances in their international
lending and have not sufficiently maintained their capacity to with-
stand such disturbances. Lending through subsidiaries and other af-
filiates has often made it more difficult for banks to monitor and
control their exposure in certain countries. 8' The capital adequacy
of many banks has declined and loan-loss provisioning has not been
adequate. Furthermore, provisioning standards frequently overlook
the risk of sovereign governments being unable to repay debts and
the related risk of countries having insufficient foreign exchange
reserves to repay private or government debts on time.82 National
supervisors permit another gap in their prudential controls by ex-
empting foreign currency deposits from the reserve requirements
applied to banks' domestic currency liabilities.83 A final systemic
shortcoming is that banks have at times lent money without sufficient
information on countries' economic and financial conditions.8 4
The Institute of International Finance, the Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements, the Cooke Committee, other supervisory groups,
and the Contact Group are addressing the need for better prevent-
ative measures that will enable banks to absorb external shocks. Yet,
sufficient progess on these issues has not been made. Aside from the
Contact Group, which is limited to EEC countries, no organization
has sufficient authority to enforce compliance with agreed upon prin-
ciples. Consolidated supervision is far from achieving universal, ef-
fective implementation.
On the international level, emergency arrangements to support
and supervise banks in severe financial crisis are even further from
being realized. Despite the BIS' efforts during the Mexican debt cri-
sis, no comprehensive international lender of last resort exists.
Commentators have proposed that such a facility be established as a
supranational institution backed by central banks, or as an institution
organized by private international banks and designed to provide li-
quidity support on a reciprocal basis. 85 Since foreign currency de-
posits generally are unprotected by national insurance schemes,
development of international deposit insurance has also been
80 M. Watson, P. Keller & D. Mathieson, INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS: DEVELOP-
MENTS AND PROSPECTS, 1984 18 (Occasional Papers of the Int'l Monetary Fund No. 31,
1984) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS, 1984].
81 Id. at 15-19.
82 R. DALE, supra note 79, at 12.
83 INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS, 1984, supra note 80, at 18.
84 Dale, Safeguarding the International Banking System, 132 THE BANKER 49, 55 (1982); see
also Surrey & Nash, supra note 43, at 125.
85 R. DALE, supra note 79, at 180.
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proposed.8 6
As a result of inadequate supervision of international banking
and other causes of the debt crisis, the financial world faces a twin
dilemma: private banks are overexposed in their lending to certain
debtor countries, and developing countries need access to new capi-
tal in order to adjust their economies and to service existing debt.8 7
Multilateral institutions and bank supervisors may recognize this di-
lemma, but existing systems do not seem capable of an adequate
response.
A number of commentators88 have suggested in various formats
the transfer of private bank loans to an international agency that
would in turn transfer its own higher rated paper to private banks.
This international agency would stretch out maturities of developing
country debt and reduce interest rates. This system would both re-
duce the debt service burden on debtor countries and increase pri-
vate bank liquidity by relieving banks of involuntary loans to debtor
countries. However, such suggestions have been criticized for elimi-
nating bank incentives to extend new involuntary loans and, para-
doxically, reducing new capital flows to debtor countries.89
The 1970s saw a dramatic shift in the composition of lending to
developing countries from official to private lending. Official credits
did not keep pace with debtor needs. Banks filled the financing gap
but shortened maturities and charged variable interest rates. With
monetary disinflation in the 1980s much higher interest rates re-
sulted. Private lending abruptly contracted following the 1982-83
debt disruptions and may now have to be supplemented by a re-
newed emphasis on official financing. IMF quotas may again have to
be increased, and the World Bank and other multilateral financial
agencies may be required to enlarge their lending activity.90
Increased leveraging of resources of the World Bank and other
multilateral institutions would also increase capital flows to debtor
countries without jeopardizing prudential controls on private
banks.9 ' William Bolin and Jorge del Canto have proposed a new
Export Development Fund that would finance medium-term loans,
86 See Cohen, U.S. Regulation of Bank Lending to LDCs: Balancing Bank Overexposure and
Credit Undersupply, 8 YALEJ. WORLD PUB. ORD. 200 (1982).
87 W. CLINE, supra note 57, at 130-33. The principle reform proposals discussed in
the United States have been advanced by Peter B. Kenen of Princeton University, Senator
Bill Bradley (D-NJ), Congressman Charles E. Schumer (D-NY), and financier Felix
Rohatyn. W. CLINE, supra note 46, at 114.
88 W. CLINE, supra note 57, at 133-35.
89 Id. at 146.
90 The World Bank has approved the creation of the Multilateral Investment Guaran-
tee Agency which will enter the arena of guaranteeing direct private investments. Voss,
Introductory Note, World Bank: Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee
Agency, 24 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1598, 1598-1600 (1985).
91 Bolin & del Canto, supra note 1, at 1110-11.
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with private banks providing shorter-term credits and the World
bank guaranteeing resources for the final period of twenty-year
loans. 92 A related proposal to bridge the gap between long-term and
short-term financing would entail the creation of a new, highly lever-
aged World Bank subsidiary.
The Baker Plan combines the elements of increased private bank
lending with greater development bank lending and participation.
However, the 29 billion dollars in new money allocated for the Bank
Plan may well be insufficient.
Coordination among international institutions has improved in
recent years. Current global financial challenges, however, call for
new arrangements, expanded institutional authority, and perhaps
new institutions.
APPENDIX
1. Expert Banking Group of the OECD. This group was formed by
the Committee on Financial Markets of the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development and consists of bank regula-
tory and supervisory officials from the 24 industrialized countries.
The Group has prepared a series of studies on differing national su-
pervisory requirements and areas for convergence of requirements.
2. Nordic Supervisory Group. This organization is the oldest of
the supervisory groups. The first official meeting of this group oc-
curred in June, 1925, between the authorities in Denmark, Finland,
Norway, and Sweden. Iceland later became a member. The Group
meets on an annual basis. The Group's general purpose has been to
exchange information rather than to adopt specific principles or
common standards. Initial meetings generally concerned the meth-
ods and organization of bank supervision. Subsequent meetings fo-
cused on specific subjects such as valuation of assets and accounting
principles. Currently, the Group has concerned itself with banks'
foreign activities, particularly the development of consortia banks
jointly owned by banks in the Nordic countries. Arrangements have
been made for coordinated supervision of the shareholding banks'
foreign departments as well as supervision of the consortia banks
themselves.
3. SEANZA Forum of Bank Supervisors. This organization was es-
tablished in 1984 by the SEANZA Council of Govenors. (SEANZA is
an organization of central banks in the Indian sub-continent, S.E.
Asia, and the Pacific Basin.) Forum members include: Australia,
Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Nepal,
92 Id. at 1109; Surrey & Nash, supra note 43, at 124.
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New Zealand, Pakistan, Singapore, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. Non-
members of SEANZA in Asia and the Pacific may attend Forum
meetings. The Forum first met in November 1984 and plans future
annual meetings. The purposes of the Forum are to foster coopera-
tion in the exchange of information and ideas and to discuss
problems of common interest. At the first meeting, each member
submitted a paper summarizing the banking system, and bank regu-
lations and supervision in the member's country.
4. Banking Supervisors of the Caribbean. This group was organized
in 1982 under the auspices of the Center of Latin American Eco-
nomic Studies in Mexico City. Membership includes banking super-
visors from twelve countries and is open to supervisors in any
Caribbean nation. Three annual meetings have been held as well as
numerous training programs. In addition to facilitating contacts
among the members, the purpose of the group is to establish and
improve standards for bank examination and supervision. Members
also participate in the Commission of Latin American and Caribbean
Banking Supervisory and Inspection Authorities.
5. The Middle East. Although there is no formal organization of
banking supervisors, contacts and collaboration among the supervi-
sors in this region have been fostered and strengthened under the
auspices of the Gulf Coordinating Council of Central Banks.
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